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THE NEW PRIVACY 
Paul M. Schwartz* and William M. Treanor** 
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY. By John Gilliam. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 2001. Pp. xv, 186. Cloth, $ 39; paper, $16. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, as the welfare state emerged in full force in the United 
States, Charles Reich published The New Property, one of the most 
influential articles ever to appear in a law review .1 Reich argued that 
in order to protect individual autonomy in an "age of governmental 
largess," a new property right in governmental benefits had to be 
recognized.2 He called this form of property the "new property."3 In 
retrospect, Reich, rather than anticipating trends, was swimming 
against the tide of history. In the past forty years, formal claims to 
government benefits have become more tenuous rather than more 
secure. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits 
of Privacy, by John Gilliom, an associate professor of political science 
at Ohio State University, demonstrates both the tenuousness of wel-
fare rights today and the costs that this system imposes on individual 
autonomy. 
In Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom uses his case study of welfare 
recipients as the occasion for an attack on classic notions of privacy 
rights. Gilliom finds that welfare clients do not engage in "privacy 
talk" - indeed, he finds the concept to be devoid of value for the wel-
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fare recipients. Here, another comparison can be made with Reich's 
new property. Reich explicitly tied his idea of a property right in 
government entitlements to privacy.4 He felt that the new property 
was needed to protect privacy and, in particular, individual autonomy.5 
Reich's notion of privacy reaches back to a classic concept of privacy, 
one that we term the "old privacy." It is precisely this classic idea that 
Gilliom finds welfare recipients to have rejected. 
Theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy has 
pointed, however, to a "new privacy."6 The new privacy is centered 
around Fair Information Practices ("FIPs") and is intended to prevent 
threats to autonomy. The idea of privacy centered on FIPs is based not 
on a property interest in one's information, but the idea that proces-
sors of personal data should be obliged to follow certain standards. If, 
as we will see, classic notions of privacy are not of much use in the 
welfare state, the new privacy may be. 
This Review begins by examining Gilliam's methodology and 
findings. It credits the insights of his look at the inner world of welfare 
recipients, but finds that he appears to ignore the need for income 
limits on aid recipients and the concomitant need for at least some 
personal information to enforce these limits. It also criticizes his fail-
ure to explore an interaction of an "ethics of care" among welfare 
recipients with possible use of retooled privacy rights or interests. 
In the second part of this Review, we consider the extent to which 
theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy points to a 
new privacy and discuss how Gilliam's empirical research provides 
support for that scholarship. We also evaluate the extent to which the 
new privacy, centered on PIPs, can prevent the threats to personal 
autonomy so poignantly identified by Gilliom. 
I. 
Gilliom considers the "everyday politics of surveillance . . . by 
those who are among the most closely watched" (pp. 3-4). His 
research began with the idea of studying a group of "people [who] live 
with surveillance as a totalizing and encompassing force which can 
critically affect their well-being" (p. 42). Accordingly, Gilliom decided 
to engage in an ethnological exploration of welfare recipients, who 
in the mid-1990s were among the most closely scrutinized of any 
Americans. Specifically, Gilliom carried out empirical research 
concerning the attitudes of a small group of low-income women in 
Appalachian Ohio towards welfare bureaucracy and information 
4. /d. at 778. 
5. /d. 
6. We discuss the old and new privacy in Part II of this Review. 
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surveillance. To a lesser (but equally fascinating) extent, Gilliom also 
looked at the attitudes of caseworkers in local welfare offices in south-
ern Ohio. 
In analyzing the interaction of welfare clients and bureaucracy, 
Gilliom first had to select a methodology. He decided not to work 
through the state-welfare bureaucracy because one of his "central 
interests was coming to know what the agencies cannot see or what 
they would forbid if they could" (p. 45). Instead, Gilliom and his assis-
tants engaged in a series of in-depth and semistructured interviews 
with current welfare recipients as well as caseworkers in southern 
Ohio. 
Interestingly enough, the interviews with the welfare clients, as 
opposed to those with the caseworkers, were carried out not by 
Gilliom, but by two former welfare recipients as paid project consult-
ants. A number of strategic choices were involved in having consult-
ants conduct these interviews. Gilliom's hope was that his consultants 
would be able to draw on their personal experience with welfare and 
their knowledge of Appalachian Ohio, and that "shared gender and 
social status, as well as the notable accent of the region, would help to 
establish a quicker relation of trust and more complete sharing of per-
spectives and practices" (p. 45). His use of the former welfare recipi-
ents as interviewers was also intended to help gain more distance from 
conventional discourse about privacy. Since the interviewers were 
unlikely to be steeped in the relevant academic and policy literature, 
their interactions with the welfare clients would be less likely to bias 
the field research (p. 45). 
The final elements in the methodology of Overseers of the Poor 
involved finding a sample group for the interviews and selecting an 
interviewing technique. The sampling technique was informal: Gilliom 
opted for a "snowball" sampling in which the field interviewers 
followed initial interviews with welfare recipients whom they knew 
"with a request for a few names of other people ... and for permission 
to mention the first subject's name in a personal introduction to those 
people" (p. 46). The interviewing technique involved taping semi-
structured interviews based on Gilliom's script. In the end, Gilliom's 
team interviewed forty-eight mothers from a four-county area. 
Gilliom concedes that this sample cannot be certified as 
" 'scientifically representative' " (p. 46). But his aim was a different 
one than locating a sample that he could prove was representative; he 
wanted "to find access to the welfare poor of the region in a way that 
would offer the level of trust necessary to undertake meaningful inter-
views about topics which might include illegalities" (p. 46). Gilliom 
succeeded in this task; his interviews cast a brilliant light on the atti-
tudes, language, and self-conception of at least one set of people 
receiving public assistance. 
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What did the interviews reveal? Gilliam first notes the general 
diversity of those in poverty and the differences among those inter-
viewed by his study. He observes: "In many ways, there is so much 
diversity that catch phrases like 'the welfare poor' are, even if used as 
a shorthand, categorizations that belie the true complexity and 
particularity of the population" (p. 65). But he also identifies some 
significant similarities among his sample group. In particular, Gilliam 
concluded this group both lacked any notable rights consciousness and 
made almost no tactical use of the law (p. 70). In this relative void, 
however, Gilliam discovered a different language and different kinds 
of activities. 
Gilliam describes an important phenomenon that he terms "rights 
talks and rights reticence" (p. 69). Following his research into how 
welfare clients view issues of "welfare administration, surveillance, 
and client information policy," Gilliam finds a striking lack of recourse 
to "the discourse of rights" (p. 70). By "rights talk," Gilliam specifi-
cally means "privacy rights talk." But what would "privacy rights talk" 
sound like for welfare clients? To be sure, welfare recipients talked 
about the indignities and oppressiveness of constantly being moni-
tored (p. 67). But welfare clients did not react to this experience with a 
belief either that they had "a right to be let alone," to use the classic 
term of Warren and Brandeis,7 or that they had existing legal interests 
that would allow them to oppose these practices (pp. 70-71). Instead, 
they engaged in "a more personalized discourse of need, care and 
responsibility" (p. 92). 
The welfare clients' great concern was to provide for their families 
when supplied with a monthly welfare check that they viewed as 
inadequate to provide for their needs. Gilliam stresses at several 
points that the low level of support provided by state welfare was 
inadequate and drove its recipients to find ways to supplement their 
income that the state bureaucracy would not detect. As he writes, 
"very few people could be eligible for aid and make it through the 
month on welfare without such measures" (p. 67). Thus, Delilah, one 
of the recipients interviewed, was cutting hair and helping her brother 
wallpaper while receiving payment in cash to evade the computers of 
the Ohio bureaucracy. When she talked about this behavior, Delilah 
did not engage in "privacy talk," but stressed her obligation to her 
family. As she stated, "I think as long as someone is using what they 
are doing for their home or they are buying something that their kids 
need, I don't see anything wrong with it" (p. 94). As Elizabeth, 
another mother, said: "[M]y girl means more to me than what they're 
gonna do" (p. 95). Or in Dewey's words, "[Y]our kids come first" 
(p. 93). 
7. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890). 
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Gilliom reports the existence of "an ethics of care" of the kind that 
Carol Gilligan first elaborated in her famous book, In a Different 
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.8 As Gilliom 
summarizes this work by Gilligan, "[T]he ethic of care emphasizes 
responsibilities, particular needs and differences, and compassion" (p. 
109). A discourse of care leads not to a discussion of an individualistic 
right to privacy, but "an emphasis on responsibility, on particular 
needs, on care for dependents" (p. 109). 
Gilliom views the welfare clients in his study as adopting an ethics 
of care because it is the most logical point of reference from which to 
organize their world. He writes, "[W]e should view these women not 
as being driven by some structure of language or perception, but, 
rather, as choosing from among the many terms and references that 
we can use to make sense of our lives and our conditions" (p. 111). 
The women at the center of his book faced "abusive practices in wel-
fare administration, rural isolation, and low education" (p. 111). 
Moreover, their lives were "surrounded by the obligations of meeting 
both the needs of their dependents and the commands of those upon 
whom they depend" (p. 111). The consequence: "In many critical 
dimensions, then, their lives, roles, experiences, and values appear to 
gravitate away from the assertion of individualistic rights and toward 
the focus on responsibility and care" (p. 111). Thus, the female welfare 
recipients at the center of Gilliam's book challenged the legitimacy of 
state government's attempts to gain information on them but not on 
the ground that the state's scrutiny involves their privacy rights. 
Rather, "their lives, roles, experiences, and values" led them to offer 
an alternative critique (p. 111). They challenged the state's informa-
tion collection on the grounds that this data processing might lead to 
the denial of benefits and thus prevent them from satisfying "the 
needs of their dependents and the commands of those upon whom 
they depend" (p. 111). With loved ones who needed help on one side, 
and the welfare bureaucrats and their computers on the other, the wel-
fare clients viewed the idea of privacy rights as empty. 
Beyond the ethics of care, Overseers of the Poor also identifies a 
cluster of three additional factors that led the welfare recipients away 
from a privacy discourse: (1) their lack of knowledge of how their per-
sonal data were actually being processed and their accompanying 
dread about surveillance; (2) their generally low level of actual rights 
or other legal interests; and (3) a lack of an active legal movement to 
help them {pp. 71-72). Thus, the interviews revealed the widespread 
ignorance of welfare recipients about the precise databases to which 
the computers of the Ohio welfare administration were linked and an 
oppressive worrying about the level of scrutiny into their lives. In 
8. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993). 
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interview after interview, Gilliom's assistants recorded complaints 
about the degradation that the welfare system visited upon the recipi-
ents. For example, Mary explained: "You have to watch every step 
like you are in prison. All the time you are on welfare, yeah, you are in 
prison" (p. 51). Gilliom also found the women plagued by strong feel-
ings of guilt about their self-help measures. 
The other factors that undercut any privacy talk are the low level 
of actual rights or other legal interests for welfare recipients and a lack 
of financial resources or an active legal movement to help them. On 
these points, Gilliom traces a decline in activity to assist welfare 
recipients by the judiciary, legislative branch, and public interest 
organizations since a high point during the mid-1960s. As Gilliom 
concludes, "Welfare mothers, as constituted by their ongoing relation-
ships and status within the welfare bureaucracy, are almost the inverse 
of the rights-bearing individual who would rise up against surveillance 
with a legal challenge" (p. 91). 
By this point in Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom has shifted from his 
earlier, apparently dialectical proposition that pitted the ethics of care 
against privacy. Gilliom's ultimate view is not dialectic; rather, it is 
simply that a group of people lacking financial resources and possess-
ing almost no privacy or legal rights are unlikely to view their world 
through the privacy perspective (pp. 70-73). Gilliom admits, in fact, 
"the importance of context ... in the formation and mobilization of 
rights claims and protest" (p. 84). This analysis suggests that the ethics 
of care could form part of a heightened interest in privacy rights. Later 
in this Review, we will discuss Fair Information Practices as the neces-
sary legal building blocks of modern information privacy rights. At 
this point, we only wish to introduce the point that an ethics of care 
and recognition of privacy rights can reinforce each other as a basis for 
challenging information collection. A group with better defined inter-
ests, institutional support, financial resources, and access to legal re-
sources might seek to protect their loved ones and affirm its connec-
tions with them through privacy claims. Here, Gilliom might have 
considered activities by public interest groups engaged in the area of 
welfare reform. The critical question is whether any interest group 
activity would encourage "the formation and mobilization of rights 
claims and protest" (p. 84). 
The first part of Gilliom's findings concerns the presence of an 
ethics of care among welfare recipients. The second part reveals a pat-
tern of everyday resistance rather than formal legal claims. At this 
point in Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom explores the actions that wel-
fare recipients take and how they attempt to shield their behavior 
from the awareness of the welfare bureaucracy. Faced with state scru-
tiny, a level of monthly care they find inadequate, and ignorance about 
important parts of the welfare system, the mothers seek cash-only jobs 
that they hide from welfare services; obtain gifts in kind from relatives 
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and friends; and enlist others in their community in avoiding rules (pp. 
93-114). 
For Gilliom, these welfare mothers engage in important acts of 
"everyday resistance" that attempt to reject and challenge "the politi-
cal commands of the state" (p. 100). Instead of legal or political 
mobilization, the welfare mothers in the book carry out in important 
"daily actions seeking to frustrate the mission of the welfare bureauc-
racy and its surveillance system" (p. 92). Gilliom summarizes: "Rather 
than publicly objecting to the infringement of their rights as citizens, 
they quietly meet the needs of their dependents through daily actions 
that defy the commands of the state" (p. 111). 
While this struggle is quiet, it is not lonely; Gilliom discusses "clear 
evidence of mutual support and cooperation among the mothers" and 
within their larger community (p. 106). As a specific example of such 
community cooperation,.one mother in the study, Mary, talks about a 
helpful convenience store clerk, who allowed her to use food stamps 
to buy diapers and other family necessities. She stated, "I mean, I 
don't buy whiskey or anything, but you can't make it if you can't buy 
your diapers and your laundry soap and things .... " (p. 49). 
Yet, resistance has its price. Gilliom finds that welfare recipients 
feel guilt and degradation, among other emotions, caused by their 
everyday evasions. He notes the "mixtures of defiance, fear, pride, 
guilt, and anger" involved in their struggles "to scrape up a little extra 
cash, or use food stamps for diapers, or hide resources which might 
threaten their eligibility" (p. 67). The presence of these emotions 
shows that the welfare recipients have accepted and internalized, at 
least to some extent, the demands of the all-knowing surveillance 
system. With reference to seminal work by Michel Foucault, Gilliom 
talks of "the frequent emergence of guilt and regret over the rule 
breaking [as] an important sign of the 'internalizing of the gaze' that 
Foucault writes of."9 
Although the bureaucratic gaze has been internalized, resistance 
continues. It is striking that parallel resistance can also be found 
among caseworkers in the welfare system. As Gilliom notes, computer 
surveillance is intended to control not only recipients, but caseworkers 
and other administrators (pp. 96-99). Rather than a system that allows 
local discretion, the state seeks to impose hierarchical control from the 
9. P. 133. The scholarship in question is MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: 
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1995) (1975). 
Foucault discusses Jeremy Bentham's 1787 proposal for a Panoptican, a prison building 
constructed in the form of a wheel to allow surveillance by a warden located in a central 
area. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICAN WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995) 
(1787). For further discussions of the Panoptican, Bentham, and Foucault, see Jamie Boyle, 
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignity, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 177, 177-78 (1997). See also OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 53-94 (1993). 
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top down. Yet, local officials battle against such control. Thus, a case-
worker identified only as "T" explained that she fights the computer 
system by putting false information into it. "T" wishes to avoid the 
computer's denying benefits to people who, in her view, were clearly 
eligible. As she states, "We can't wait until the state decides to repro-
gram [the computer]. I mean, we have to get these people a check if 
they're eligible for it and I guess you have to do it by whatever means 
possible because we have no other way" (p. 98). One is left wishing 
that Gilliom devoted more time and space to exploring the views of 
the caseworkers. This evidence of resistance from within the system 
provides a tantalizing suggestion of internal limits on bureaucratic 
rationality.10 
In a nutshell then, Gilliom views the chief contribution of his 
research as its "exploration of the everyday consciousness of people 
who are struggling with political domination on their own and in the 
absence of organization or support" (p. 85). In place of rights talk, he 
describes both an ethics of care and the politics of everyday resistance. 
And in Gilliom's view, our future experience may well look like the 
present condition of the welfare mothers of his book. In a key passage 
he argues: 
Once elaborate systems of bureaucratic surveillance are erected, it may 
be especially difficult to confront them with conventional political chal-
lenge. And as mechanisms of surveillance push the issues of visibility and 
verification to the forefront of long-standing struggles between citizens 
and institutions, practices of deception, camouflage, and secrecy are the 
necessary politics of our times. Everyday tactics of evasion, subterfuge, 
and concealment, then, may very well become a defining form of politics 
in the surveillance society. (p. 101) 
Gilliom also faults privacy laws that seek to limit surveillance pro-
grams with requirements of access and correction. In his view, rather 
than these underused legal rights, a more likely future pattern will be 
"complaint, evasion, and resistance" by affected individuals (pp. 101, 
112). 
Finally, in a coda to Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom offers a first-
hand account of his own experiences in the summer of 1999 as he 
sought to complete the book. In August 1999, law enforcement offi-
cials landed at Gilliom's farm, searched his back fields and hills, and 
an adjacent national forest, and then obtained a warrant and searched 
his home. This armed invasion, search of his home, and investigation 
of Gilliom and his wife for federal felonies amounted to a "rapid, 
intense, and visceral education into the politics of surveillance, pri-
vacy, power, and the law" (p. 137). 
10. For a classic exploration from the 1980s of these limits within the administration of 
social security disability claims, see JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983). 
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In his account of these events, Gilliam first describes the setting of 
his home as "an aging farmhouse situated in a small valley of about 
sixty rough, hilly, and mostly wooded acres" (p. 138). His house is 
surrounded by forests of private and public land, and the region of the 
state in which he lives is known both for its marijuana cultivation and 
constant observation by the helicopters of the State Bureau of 
Criminal Identification and Investigation. When the police helicopters 
landed at his home, his housesitters reached him out of town, where 
Gilliam was visiting friends, to tell him of this development. Gilliam 
assured them that "[w]e were innocent of wrongdoing and had no rea-
son for concern" (p. 139). As Gilliam writes, he knew that he was 
innocent of growing the marijuana, but "I was lying ... with the asser-
tion that we had nothing to worry about" (p. 139). 
Gilliam was worried because he and Amy King, his life partner, 
had been vocal and public critics of the local police department. 
Moreover, King was the head of the regional branch of the American 
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). With King, Gilliam had engaged in 
high profile activism to challenge the practices of local police, includ-
ing the policies of narcotic officers and prosecutors. In fighting the war 
on drugs, the local constabulary "had committed strings of rights viola-
tions" (p. 139). Gilliam reports that, beyond violating individual rights, 
local law enforcement had engaged in offenses including "an almost 
endless string of corruptions, excesses, and embarrassments among the 
law enforcement agencies and the offices of the county prosecutor" (p. 
139). In light of his activism, Gilliam advises us, "I hope that the 
reader can pause and imagine absolutely every nook and cranny of 
your home ransacked not just by strangers, but by strangers who 
would probably like nothing more than to hang you out to dry" (p. 
145). 
The search of Gilliam and King's home did not lead to formal 
charges against them, and he in turn decided not to sue the law 
enforcement officials. With the passage of some time, Gilliam organ-
ized his thoughts about this experience around two insights. First, he 
and his life partner engaged in a mixture of both law talk and care talk 
in reaction to the search and its aftermath. As for the law talk, Gilliam 
notes, "We had called a defense attorney within minutes of hearing 
the news; hired a former judge as our attorney within a few days; and 
consulted with the state director of the ACLU and a widely recog-
nized civil rights attorney in subsequent weeks" (p. 147). Gilliam 
attributes his recourse to rights talk, in contrast to the welfare clients, 
to his superior resources and better awareness of legal language ("due 
process, warrants, the Fourth Amendment") (p. 147). 
As for the care talk, Gilliam notes how he and his life partner 
worried most about "the impact of arrest or litigation on our children" 
(p. 147). He observes: 
In short, every calculation and decision that we attempted to make about 
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how we were going to cope with the law was embedded in a context of 
thinking about our own needs for money, security, and dignity and our 
children's needs for a sane household, nonincarcerated parents, and, of 
course, all the money we might need to spend on litigation. (pp. 147-48) 
Thus, Gilliom's report of his personal experience shows that privacy 
rights and care are not opposed, but rather embedded in a given 
context that shapes their relation to each other. 
Gilliom's second set of insights concerned the nature of the politics 
of surveillance. He found that while the invasion of his home was "a 
massive violation of our privacy," that was perhaps "the most fleeting" 
of the harms suffered (p. 149). He writes, "What continued was how 
the structures of power, surveillance, and law interacted with the reali-
ties of our daily lives to rob us of what we. felt to be both our integrity 
and our citizenship" (p. 149). Gilliom ultimately decided not to sue the 
authorities for the violation because of the accompanying stress, 
money to be spent on lawyers, and "the possibility that poking the 
authorities with a lawsuit would provoke retaliatory action" (p. 149). 
Regarding the language of rights, Gilliom sadly concludes, "[A]ll the 
accessibility that we had felt regarding the language of rights was 
misleading. We could speak them, but we could not really afford 
them" (p. 149). 
Thus, for Gilliom, the experience of surveillance caused a harm to 
his self-image and his desire and capacity to engage in activism. He 
writes, "The combined impact of the state's power to compel, watch, 
and punish, the sheriff's power to retaliate against challenge, and our 
duty to meet the needs of our family, has stolen the senses of auton-
omy and control upon which full citizenship is based" (p. 150). In his 
view, this loss hurt him more than the theft of his privacy when his 
house was ransacked. Gilliom ends his book by noting that like the 
welfare recipients, "We are all watched, we are all angry, and we are 
all afraid. And we are increasingly without a language to speak about 
it" (p. 150). 
This incident and Gilliom's response to it suggest how surveillance 
stifles dissent. But in challenging surveillance by law enforcement 
agencies, Gilliom does not confront the other side of the equation. 
Obviously, there is a legitimate role for criminal investigation in the 
realm of criminal-law enforcement. This critique of Gilliom's discus-
sion of law enforcement is equally applicable in his treatment of wel-
fare oversight, where there is a similar necessity of some surveillance 
by the stateY Here, we wish to leave criminal procedure behind and 
return to the topic of welfare oversight. 
11. At least some surveillance by private parties is also needed at times, see, for exam-
ple, Anita Allen, The Wanted Gaze: Accountability for Interpersonal Conduct at Work, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2013 (2001) (discussing need for accountability in the workplace, including work-
place monitoring of employees, to prevent sexual harassment of working women). 
May2003) The New Privacy 2173 
At times, Gilliom writes as if the government has no valid interest 
in gathering information about welfare recipients. He seems to regard 
the so-called "declaration era" of the late 1960s with straightforward 
approval. This was a short-lived epoch when "the poor- at least in 
some regions of the country - [were] in the position of advancing 
their own version of needs and budgets, their own version of 
resources, and their own take on the government's 'mean's test' " (p. 
29). During that period, "program administrators placed greater 
emphasis on accepting the terms and condition of poor people's needs 
as they were presented by the poor themselves" (p. 28). This state of 
affairs is a potential prescription for disaster. Imagine any group in 
society, regardless of the identity of this aggregation, able to advance 
"their own version of needs and budgets, their own version of 
resources" when asking for governmental money, as well as their own 
perspective on outside controls. The danger is that any one-sided 
claim on both governmental resources and on the nature of the 
evaluations of requests will lead to waste, to extravagant demands for 
support, and to exploding governmental budgets. Put simply, it is as if 
Gilliom considers the government to be acting only for the purpose of 
social control and not for valid administrative purposes, such as fraud 
prevention. 
Gilliom ignores the necessity for income limits on aid recipients 
and the concomitant need for information to enforce these limits. In 
the kind of achievement-oriented "service administration" that is now 
in place at the federal and state levels, information collection is a 
central necessity. As one of us wrote over a decade ago, "the state 
today depends upon the availability of vast quantities of information, 
and much of the data it now collects relates to identifiable individuals. 
Indeed, the fulfillment of many governmental objectives depends on 
the gathering of such personal information."12 
In the specific context of welfare, moreover, administrators have 
turned to information processing to avoid two sets of past problems. 
First, scarce resources must be distributed among a high volume of 
applicants. Gilliom cites scholarship depicting welfare administration 
before computerization as "organized anarchy" in which "the effects 
of actions or techniques could not even be assessed" (p. 33). Comput-
erized information processing appears to offer an alternative to "an 
administrative and recotd-keeping system based entirely on paper-
work and oral exchanges" (p. 33). Second, abuses of administrative 
discretion within the old system also made a shift to a data-processing 
model attractive. These abuses included midnight searches of the 
12. Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of 
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332 (1992). 
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homes of welfare recipients and the application of widely divergent lo-
cal norms within the same stateP 
Gilliom's account is therefore flawed because it fails to recognize 
the need for income limits and information collection. Gilliom also 
passes over an important area for exploration - the impact of the 
massive legislative changes made in 1996 to the long-established wel-
fare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").14 
The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") program, es-
tablished in 1996, seeks no less than an end to welfare dependency in 
the United States. It makes recipients of welfare assistance subject to a 
two-year limit on aid and a work requirementP Gilliom's book, pub-
lished five years after enactment of the TANF, should have evaluated 
the extent to which this new statute is encouraging the same kind of 
massive, low-profile resistance as AFDC once did. One promising area 
for research would be TANF's combination of a work requirement 
with a low level of support for child-care services.16 This combination 
may encourage the kind of off-the-books activity and other evasions 
that Gilliom found prevalent under AFDC. 
Gilliom's Overseers of the Poor demonstrates both the impact of 
information collection and the response of a particular group of 
people to such surveillance. But this book, despite its value as an 
empirical study, is weakened by a too simplistic challenge to informa-
tion collection. Failing to acknowledge in any meaningful way that 
information collection can be legitimate, Gilliom fails to explore the 
tough questions: What personal information should be collected and 
what uses should be made of the data? 
II. 
In the second part of this Review, we explore the relationship 
between Gilliom's findings and an emerging critique of privacy law. 
This path bring us back to Charles Reich's famous article from 1964, 
The New Property. As noted in our introduction, Charles Reich 
13. Id. at 1354. 
14. For a discussion of AFDC, see id. at 1352. 
15. The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Act was enacted as the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 
Stat. 2105. For more on this Act, see the home page of the bureaucracy, The Office of Fam-
ily Assistance, which oversees it. The Office of Family Assistance, at 
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa! (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). 
16. The current political stalemate over TANF's future sees President Bush advocating 
a tougher work requirement and Democrats wanting to increase funding for child care. See 
Amy Goldstein, Bush Presses Lawmakers to Back Welfare Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 
2003, at A4. Regardless of the issue of resistance by welfare recipients to program obliga-
tions, an increasing problem is homelessness among the working poor. See Francis X. Clines, 
Life After Welfare in the Here and Now of America's Jammed Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2002, at A22. 
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argued in this article that in light of changed social circumstances, a 
new property in governmental benefits was necessary. Reich observed, 
"The wealth of more and more Americans depend upon a relationship 
to government.'m Reich found that this reliance on government also 
created dependence.,....... especially in the context of public assistance.18 
The solution of Reich almost four decades ago was to propose a 
property right in government entitlements. Reich argued, "Property is 
a legal institution the essence of which is the creation and protection 
of certain private rights in wealth of any kind.''19 Moreover, property 
"performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and 
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to 
yield to the owner.''20 Property matters, in fact, because it helps 
preserve autonomy, or as Reich writes at one point, "the American 
character" and the "independent base" from which people can "assert 
their individuality and claim their rights.''21 Interestingly enough, 
Reich links property to privacy. 
For Reich, privacy provides a sanctuary that shelters the individual 
from the power of the government and organizations in the private 
sector. As he notes of the threat that appeared by the 1960s, "The 
pressures on the individual are greatly increased by the interrelated-
ness of society and the pervasiveness of regulation.''22 The conse-
quences are potentially dire: "Caught in the vast network of regula-
tion, the individual has no hiding place.''23 In contrast, a propertization 
of government benefits, Reich's new property, would protect liberty. 
As Reich proposed, "[T)here must be a zone of privacy for each indi-
vidual beyond which neither government nor private power can push 
- a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and 
control.''24 Propertization of benefits would create the needed "sanc-
tuaries or enclaves where no majority can reach."25 Or, as Reich writes 
in developing his privacy-as-sanctuary metaphor, property gives the 
individual "a small but sovereign island of his own."26 
While Reich demanded the creation of a new property, he did so 
based on an "old privacy." Although he did not cite to any privacy 
literature in The New Property, Reich's language of privacy-as-
17. Reich, supra note 1, at 733. 
18. I d. at 758. 
19. I d. at 771. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22 I d. at 759. 
23. I d. at 760. 
24. ld. at 785. 
25. ld. at 787. 
26. I d. at 774. 
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sanctuary evoked another famous law review article. In 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right of Privacy conceived of 
privacy as the right "to be let alone.'m In their words, the law cannot 
merely consider "a man's house as his castle" and then "open wide the 
back door" to invasions of privacy.28 This idea is shared by Reich who 
writes, "There must be a zone of privacy for each individual beyond 
which neither government nor private power can push - a hiding 
place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and control."29 
In contrast to Reich, however, Warren and Brandeis were more 
than ambivalent about property law. Much of their article analyzes 
leading intellectual property cases of their day. Based on their close 
reading of these cases, Warren and Brandeis argued that certain judi-
cial opinions that seemed to protect only intellectual property rights, 
such as a decision stopping an unauthorized publication of a photo-
graph, were actually seeking to protect the individual's "inviolate 
personality."30 Warren and Brandeis also appeared doubtful whether 
property as an institution would be capable of providing a solid basis 
for "a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensa-
tions."31 Thus, unlike Reich's neat tie between privacy and property, 
Warren and Brandeis were less certain that privacy could be protected 
through property rights. 
The old privacy reached its apogee in tort law and the Restatement 
of Torts. In 1960, William Prosser first proposed that the tort of 
invasion of privacy be divided into four distinct branches and then, as 
reporter for the relevant sections, imported his proposal into the 
Restatement of Torts.32 It is essentially this tort-based concept of "old 
privacy" that Gilliom attacks in Overseers of the Poor. As we saw in 
Part I, Gilliom finds the idea of privacy rights to be absent from the 
discourse of welfare recipients. To the extent that the privacy at stake 
is a notion of a right "to be let alone," (Warren and Brandeis) or an 
idea of an "enclave" beyond the reach of the majority (Reich), it is not 
surprising that welfare beneficiaries avoid these concepts. After all, as 
Gilliom himself holds, welfare recipients are "constituted by their 
ongoing relationships and status within welfare bureaucracy" (p. 91). 
If there is an old privacy, however, there must also be a new one. 
We now wish to explore the relationship between Gilliom's findings 
27. Warren &Brandeis, supra note 7, at 195. 
28. I d. at 220. 
29. Reich, supra note 1, at 785. 
30. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 205. 
31. Id. at 206. For an exploration of the ambivalence of Warren and Brandeis to prop-
erty-based conceptions of privacy, see Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Pri-
vacy, Property and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647,668-70 (1991). 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A (1976); William Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
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and an emerging critique of privacy law. As developed in writings by 
Julie Cohen, Priscilla Regan, Paul Schwartz, Daniel Solove, and oth-
ers, a significant attempt has been made in the academy to go beyond 
existing "privacy rights" talk.33 These authors, working independently 
of each other, have sought to develop a normative basis for an infor-
mation privacy law based not in a right of "individual control" over 
information, but in the idea of privacy as a social good. Gilliam states: 
"[T]he language of privacy rights is the only show in town" in 
academic and policy debates (p. 120). Yet, the new critique of the 
individualistic privacy paradigm marks the emergence of a significant 
new approach. From the work of these writers, we see the emergence 
of a "new privacy." 
Before turning to these scholars, however, we explore the scholar-
ship of Robert Post, who provides a key intellectual link between the 
old and new concepts of privacy. As noted, the old privacy is tort 
privacy, which has its origins in the famous article by Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis and the Restatement of Torts as shaped by Dean 
Prosser?4 Scholars have frequently seen the privacy tort as concerned 
predominately with individual interests, but Post in 1989 offered an 
innovative reinterpretation of the classic right of privacy.35 
As Post explains, the privacy tort represents not "a value asserted 
by individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive society," 
but a necessary aspect of relations with others.36 Rather than uphold-
ing "the interests of individuals against the demands of community," 
information privacy creates rules that in some significant measure 
"constitute both individuals and community."37 The fashion by which 
privacy standards carry out this constitutive task is by confining 
personal information within boundaries that the standards norma-
tively define. In Post's words, privacy's function is to develop "infor-
33. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995); Julie E. Cohen, Examined 
Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, 
and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743 [hereinafter Schwartz, Beyond 
Lessig's Code]; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 
(2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Privacy]; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in 
Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace]; 
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, 
Privacy and Power]. 
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 193. 
35. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989). 
36. !d. at 958. 
37. !d. at 959. 
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mation terrorities."38 The establishment of these "information pre-
serves" is a critical means for defining social and individuallife.39 
But how does the privacy tort shape and constitute information 
preserves? According to Post, litigants, judges, and juries draw on and 
refine the legal expression of general community norms through open-
ended inquiries around language fixed in state tort law and the 
Restatement of Torts. The critical inquiry developed in these sources 
is whether the "reasonable person" would find certain invasions of 
privacy "highly offensive."40 The resulting legal verdicts confirm or 
elaborate shared values and thereby strengthen community. 
Here is where the difficulty arises: this legal method worked in the 
past, in Post's view, because it rested upon a certain kind of commu-
nity. Post argues that "privacy is for us a living reality only because we 
enjoy a certain kind of communal existence."41 Yet, we now interact 
increasingly with large bureaucracies. The relationships we have with 
such organizations are not "social and communal. "42 As Post observes, 
these relationships are based on managerial efficiency and lack the 
characteristics that are necessary to generate privacy rules.43 One is 
reminded of Jtirgen Habermas's warning of the fashion in which 
bureaucratic entities engage in a "colonialization of the lifeworld" of 
the individual.44 Habermas believes that democratic values both create 
and depend on a discursive building of consensus.45 The danger of the 
"colonialization" that he decries is that the instrumental views of 
bureaucracy will occupy and hollow out the private sphere in which 
equal citizens can engage in free discussion and opinion formation.46 
38. I d. at 984-85. 
39. ld. 
40. Id. In other words, the judge or jury evaluates an informational privacy interest in 
reference to an act of intrusion or disclosure, and thereby makes a judgment about the ap-
propriate use of the related personal information. I d. at 985. 
41. Id. at 1010. 
42. Id. at 1009. 
43. ld. 
44. 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 221 (1981). 
45. ld. 
46. ld; see JORGEN HABERMAS, STRUKTURWANDEL DER 0FFENTLICHKEIT 27 (1990) 
(describing the rise of a public sphere in the eighteenth century and its later fall under pres-
sure of mass media, bureaucracy, and "juridification" (Verrechtlichungssphaenomene)); 
JORGEN HABERMAS, TECHNIK UND WISSENSCHAFI ALS "IDEOLOGIE" 131 (1969) (demon-
strating the difficulties of participatory role for the public in discussions between politicians 
and experts). Despite the pessimistic conclusions about bureaucracy and information privacy 
that we derive from Habermas's work, we wish to note that Michael Froomkin has used 
Habermas to derive relatively optimistic conclusions concerning bureaucracy and the stan-
dards-setting process for the Internet. See A. Michael Froomkin, Haberrnas@discourse.net: 
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003). 
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Post's work represents an important revision of the old privacy 
because he sees privacy, not simply as an individual right, but as a nec-
essary precondition for community. Nonetheless, Post's approach is 
still an old privacy approach because it rests on the notion of shared, 
pre-existing norms of the private. Despite its analytical power, Post's 
approach does not provide a foundation for a normative conceptuali-
zation of privacy in a bureaucratic, rather than a communal setting. 
Post simply considers the bureaucratic realm a domain in which pri-
vacy, at least as he conceives of it, cannot exist. To be sure, Post does 
furnish a deeper theoretical basis for Gilliom's attack on classic 
notions of privacy. His work shows that it is not surprising that Gilliom 
finds weaknesses in classic notions of privacy; the subjects of Overseers 
of the Poor are located, after all, in a setting in which the assumptions 
of the old privacy do not fit. Post accomplishes much, but his work 
does not provide help to those who would rethink data privacy in the 
Information Age. 
Thus, the old privacy, even in Post's hands, proves of limited assis-
tance in confronting the modern bureaucratic state. What then of the 
new privacy? The proponents of the new privacy provide a guide to 
the creation of privacy rules in settings where the assumptions of the 
old privacy fall short. Like Post, these scholars reject privacy as an 
individual right of control. These authors argue that privacy is a kind 
of social good. As Priscilla Regan wrote in 1995, for example, "Most 
privacy scholars emphasize that the individual is better if privacy 
exists; I argue that society is better off as well when privacy exists."47 
The theorists of the new privacy desire protection for autonomy. 
As Julie Cohen writes, for example, "Autonomy in a contingent world 
requires a zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and inter-
ference - a field of operation within which to engage in the conscious 
construction of self."48 For Cohen, the autonomy fostered by informa-
tion privacy generates concrete collective benefits. As she writes, "A 
robust and varied debate on matters of public concern requires the 
opportunity to experiment with self-definition in private, and (if one 
desires) to keep distinct social, commercial, and political associations 
separate from one another."49 Solove made the same connection by 
creatively linking the problem of privacy in the modern world to that 
depicted in Franz Kafka's The Tria/.50 Elaborating on this linkage, 
Solove states that The Trial illustrates that "relationships to bureauc-
47. REGAN, supra note 33, at 221. 
48. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1424. 
49. ld. at 1426-27. 
50. Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 33, at 1422. 
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racies which are unbalanced in power can have debilitating effects 
upon individuals- regardless of the bureaucracies' purposes."51 
One of the authors of this Review has offered an expanded justifi-
cation of the right to privacy. Paul Schwartz proposes that information 
privacy be seen as protecting both deliberative autonomy and delib-
erative democracy.52 Deliberative autonomy is an individual process of 
self-governance; deliberative democracy is a group-oriented process 
for critical discourse.53 Schwartz's approach highlights the extent to 
which privacy is a necessary precondition to a fully functioning 
democracy. And, here, the old privacy (as reinterpreted by Post) and 
the new privacy agree on the necessary communal basis for privacy: 
"[T]he law must structure the use of personal information so that indi-
viduals will be free from state or community intimidation that would 
destroy their involvement in the democratic life of the community."54 
While defenders of the new privacy and the old privacy both see 
this interest as vital, they differ in how we should determine the 
proper scope of the necessary privacy protections. Post had seen 
the old privacy as generated and protected through tort litigation. 
Litigants, judges, and juries were to develop the legal expression of 
general community norms through inquiries around issues such as 
whether the "reasonable person" would find certain invasions of 
privacy "highly offensive."55 Thus, the old privacy reflects the premise 
of shared norms being identified and elaborated through litigation. In 
contrast, the generally agreed upon path to the new privacy is through 
PIPs, which are generated primarily through the legislative process. 
These rules for use of personal data have been discussed and used in 
the United States -and on an international basis -since the 1970s.56 
FIPs, therefore, predate the work of the theorists of the new privacy, 
but have assumed new significance in the work of these scholars. 
PIPs are attractive because they offer the chance for autonomy 
protection through rules for the use of personal data that are created 
51. !d. at 1423. 
52. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector 
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560-61 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
Privacy and Participation]; see Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 33, at 1650-54. 
For the elaboration of the distinction between deliberative autonomy and deliberative de-
mocracy, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 
211, 253-55 (1993). 
53. Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 33, at 1648-56. 
54. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 52, at 561. 
55. For Post, the judge or jury evaluates an informational privacy interest in reference to 
an act of intrusion or disclosure, and thereby makes a judgment about the appropriate use of 
the related personal information. Post, supra note 35, at 981-82. 
56. For a discussion that notes differences between Fair Information Practices in 
Europe and the United States, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REJDENBERG, DATA 
PRIVACY LAW 5-17 (1996). 
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by democratic institutions - in particular, but not exclusively, by the 
legislature.57 That is, at least, the rosy scenario, which we first wish to 
sketch before considering a darker picture of PIPs. Where advocates 
of the old privacy see privacy norms as preexisting, new privacy advo-
cates see them as constructed largely through majoritarian decision-
making. Thus, Schwartz proposes, "PIPs can play a significant role in 
the construction of multidimensional information territories that 
insulate personal data from socially harmful kinds of observation and 
use by different parties."58 Or, as Cohen writes, legislating for informa-
tion privacy "must delineate the appropriate boundary between 
ownership and speech, specify the parameters for effective consent, 
and impose meaningful procedural and substantive protections of 
information practices."59 Cohen also discusses the need to revisit 
certain PIPs on an ongoing basis: "Some fair information practices are 
likely to require ongoing regulatory oversight. Others are likely to 
require rulemaking at regular intervals. "60 
What are PIPs to look like? Although the expression of PIPs in 
different statutes and regulations will vary in details, sometimes 
crucially, a formulation with nine elements is possible: (1) defined 
limits, often statutory in nature, for processors of personal information 
(purpose specification); (2) processing systems that the concerned 
individual can understand (transparent processing systems); (3) notice 
to the individual; ( 4) individual choice or consent regarding the further 
use of her personal information; (5) security for stored data; (6) limits 
on data retention; (7) data quality (accurate and timely information); 
(8) access to one's personal data; and (9) enforcement of privacy rights 
and standards, which can involve, often in combination, individual 
litigation, government oversight, or industry self-regulation. We return 
to these elements of PIPs shortly and assess Gilliam's portrait of Ohio 
welfare law in light of them. 
In Part II, we have gone from the old to the new privacy and ad-
dressed the idea of PIPs. We now return to Gilliam and his Overseers 
of the Poor. Gilliam builds on the interviews with the welfare clients to 
criticize a privacy paradigm that posits a ruggedly autonomous indi-
vidual located in a natural state of solitude. For Gilliam, an individual 
cannot be seen "as existing in a free and natural state prior to the 'visi-
tation' by a surveillance program and as returning to that state of 
privacy and solitude once the observation is completed" (p. 122). In 
particular, privacy is not something that can be restored once the 
57. For a discussion of the importance of courts in interpreting information privacy stat-
utes, see Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy 
Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003). 
58. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code, supra note 33, at 780. 
59. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1435. 
60. /d. at 1436. 
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surveillance system is turned off. As he writes, "the impact of surveil-
lance" is the way it forms "permanent frames of reference, assessment, 
and decision" (p. 122). The effects of surveillance include: 
degradation, the loss of control, the implied suspicion, the feelings of 
being just a number, the anxiety over errors or subterfuges being caught, 
the fear of malevolence or incompetence on the part of surveillance prac-
titioners, the fear of breaking rules or departing from norms that are un-
known, and, especially, the need or desire to break the rules. (p. 125) 
As we have seen in this Part, this view of privacy is shared by the 
scholars who have developed the new privacy. To return again to 
Cohen, she writes, "Autonomous individuals do not spring full-blown 
from the womb .... [A]utonomy is radically contingent upon envi-
ronment and circumstance."61 And the concerns of these scholars with 
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy is also well illus-
trated by Overseers of the Poor. Indeed, both the welfare recipients 
and Gilliam's encounter with the local police illustrate the contingency 
of autonomy, and the necessity of information privacy, for deliberative 
democracy. If adequate rules are not in place for the collection and 
use of personal information, citizens will engage in neither criticism of 
the government nor unfettered debate about social issues. As Gilliam 
insightfully observes, surveillance systems are "both an expression and 
instrument of power" (p. 3). 
The remaining issue is whether FIPs are likely to have a positive 
impact, as the scholars of the new privacy hope, or are doomed to fail-
ure, as Gilliam concludes of the privacy rights that he criticizes. 
Although he does not explore the concept of FIPs in any detail, 
Gilliam depicts their failure within Ohio welfare administration. 
Indeed, the problems that Gilliam identifies can be analyzed through a 
focus on FIPs. 
To begin with, the Ohio system is exceptionally difficult to under-
stand. Indeed, Gilliam describes how even caseworkers in Ohio are 
frequently at a loss to explain basic elements of regulation, such as 
whether potential employment is permissible or not. It is also clear 
that the individual receives notice neither of initial data processing nor 
of further data sharing. Limits on data retention appear not to exist. 
Moreover, access to one's personal data is generally limited. Gilliam 
also notes that any existing requirements of access and correction are 
underused. Finally, enforcement of privacy rights is almost completely 
absent. As Gilliam describes it, the ignorance, fear and need of wei-
61. Cohen, supra note 33, at 1424; see Schwartz, Internet Privacy, supra note 33, at 821 
(discussing "autonomy trap," a belief in choice that ignores "(1) the strong limitations exist-
ing on informational self-determination ... (2) the fashion in which individual autonomy 
itself is shaped by the processing of personal data; and (3) the extent to which the State and 
private entities remove certain uses or certain types of personal data entirely from the do-
main of two-party negotiations"). 
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fare recipients causes a low level of use of whatever legal interests do 
exist (pp. 85-90). 
Gilliom's account does not mean, however, that privacy rights 
cannot be protected. Most obviously, a group with better-defined 
rights, institutional support, financial resources, and access to legal 
resources would be better able to make privacy claims. Indeed, the 
lack of institutional support in asserting privacy claims, which is a 
principal focus of Gilliom's critique, can be remedied and, in some 
circumstance, this remedy can be obtained at a modest price. A recent 
survey sponsored by the Center for Policy Research has analyzed the 
usefulness of using telephone hotlines to provide brief legal advice and 
referrals to low-income people.62 This survey found that telephone 
hotlines could be quite helpful; the callers who understood what they 
were told to do and followed the advice given tended to prevail in re-
solving their problems.63 Telephone hotlines might also be created to 
give a target population privacy advice, such as regards available FIPs. 
In large measure, however, this Review has stuck to the rosy 
scenario about FIPs. One can also be decidedly less positive regarding 
these standards as potential safeguards for autonomy and democracy. 
As we have seen, FIPs should be defined by the legislative branch and 
administrative agencies, and, by Cohen's suggestion, even frequently 
revisited as technological and other changes occur. The first danger for 
FIPs is of data-collection creep - the legislature and administrative 
agencies, whether focused on welfare or other areas, may prove likely 
to increase information collection, processing, and sharing. The second 
danger is that the legislature and administrative agencies may create 
only watered-down FIPs or dilute existing ones. The result will be 
weak or ineffective FIPs. 
As for data collection creep, Gilliom notes that obtaining welfare 
in Ohio involved answering roughly 770 questions (p. 34). One can 
imagine no better example of excessive data collection. As for the 
weak or ineffective FIPs, the lack of notice to individuals, and the 
absence of a transparent, or understandable, information processing 
system are also notable in Gilliom's portrait of Ohio welfare admini-
stration. The danger is that these kinds of data processing systems be-
come a way to keep deserving applicants from obtaining welfare -
potentially deserving recipients may either be scared off or over-
whelmed by paperwork and other requirements.64 
62. Jessica Pearson & Lanae Davis, Ctr. for Pol'y Research, The Hotline Outcomes As-
sessment Study: Final Report- Phase Ill: Full-Scale Telephone Survey (Nov. 2002), available 
at http://www.clasp.org/NLADNDMS/Documents/1037903536.22/finalhlreport.pdf. 
63. ld. 
64. For a discussion of how welfare applicants can be overwhelmed by paperwork re-
quirements, see Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 52, at 1359-60. 
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There can be no underestimating the dangers of data-collection 
creep and weak FIPs. Here, we offer three concluding observations. 
First, we need a constant internal critique of data-processing systems 
that collect personal data. Put differently, bureaucratic rationality is 
anything but rational - recall the 770 questions asked of welfare 
applicants in Ohio and the way that data collection practices become a 
bar to assisting the needy. Those interested in information privacy 
must be ready to show where data collection and processing are 
unnecessary, are disproportionate to the ends sought, or are ill-
designed to meet stated goals. This kind of analysis should draw on the 
perspective not only of the new privacy, but of administrative law, 
computer science, and economics. 
Second, the kind of participation and process available under the 
old privacy tort has no real equivalent in the bureaucratic world of the 
new privacy and FIPs. Thus, the issues of inadequate support levels in 
AFDC and inadequate allowances for child care under TANF, are not 
something that FIPs can resolve. Moreover, as Post points out, we will 
not be able to discover communal norms in the bureaucratic world of 
administered social services. The second-best strategy? To try to struc-
ture the greatest transparency possible about the process of creating 
information processing systems and shaping FIPs. Information will 
also be needed about the functioning of the resulting systems. 
Overseers of the Poor, a largely empirical work, enriches the theo-
retical debate about information privacy. It shows how a particular 
group in a particular context thinks about governmental attempts to 
use information. Based on his empirical study of welfare recipients, 
Gilliom critiques what we have termed the "old privacy" in this 
Review. His data can also be used to deepen an analysis centered on 
the new privacy. As Gilliom suggests, classic old privacy conceptions 
provide scant help when people do not engage in privacy-rights talk 
and when interactions are with a bureaucratic organization. Moreover, 
the threat to individual autonomy that Gilliom chronicles is a signifi-
cant problem. 
The new privacy seeks to confront precisely the issue of the threat 
to autonomy that is raised by data processing in bureaucracies. The 
new-privacy scholarship calls for majoritarian construction of privacy 
standards that will, in tum, help foster the individual autonomy neces-
sary for majoritarian governance. Drawing on his case studies, Gilliom 
finds the old privacy irrelevant to the world he describes. But the 
Overseers of the Poor also shows why the new-privacy scholars are so 
worried about threats to autonomy. It demonstrates the importance of 
developing privacy standards in law to help preserve the individual 
capacity for self-determination. 
